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Abstract
Age differences in monetary decisions may emerge because younger and older adults
perceive the value of outcomes differently. Yet, age-differential effects of monetary
rewards on decisions are not well understood. Most laboratory studies on aging and
decision making have used scenarios in which rewards were merely hypothetical
(decisions did not have any real consequences) or in which only small amounts of
money were at stake. In the current study, we compared younger adults' (20–
29 years) and older adults' (61–82 years) decisions in probabilistic choice problems
with real or hypothetical rewards. Decision-contingent rewards were in a typical
range of previous studies (gains of up to 4.25 USD) or substantially scaled up (gains
of up to 85 USD per participant). Reward type (real vs. hypothetical) affected deci-
sion quality, including value maximization, switching between options, and domi-
nance violations (choices of an option that was inferior to another option in all
respects). Decision quality was markedly better with real than hypothetical rewards
in older adults and correlated with numeracy in both age groups. However, we found
no evidence that reward type affected people's risk preferences. Overall, the findings
portray a fairly positive picture regarding the use of hypothetical scenarios to assess
preferences: With carefully prepared instructions, people from different age groups
indicate preferences in hypothetical scenarios that match their decisions with real
and much higher rewards. One advantage of using real rewards is that they help to
reduce decision noise.
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1 | ADULT AGE DIFFERENCES IN
MONETARY DECISIONS WITH REAL AND
HYPOTHETICAL REWARD
Many classic studies in the field of behavioral decision making
have used hypothetical scenarios, assuming that they provide an
adequate proxy for the decisions people would make when facing
real consequences (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Moreover, a
vast majority of these studies have focused exclusively on deci-
sions by younger adults. However, older adults also have to make
important financial, political, and health-related decisions, making it
critical to consider age-related differences in how well the conclu-
sions from hypothetical scenarios apply to decisions with real
consequences.
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Aging is associated with significant changes in cognitive abilities,
motivation, and emotion, which affect preferences and decision out-
comes (e.g., Bruine de Bruin et al., 2020; Freund & Ebner, 2005; Mata
et al., 2011; Mather & Carstensen, 2005). For instance, Tymula
et al. (2013) reported that healthy older adults are “strikingly inconsis-
tent” in their choices in comparison with younger adults and
concluded that “just as [older adults] show profound declines in cogni-
tive function, they also show profound declines in choice rationality
compared with their younger peers” (p. 17143). Moreover, many deci-
sions across the lifespan about well-being and wealth involve risk. In
decisions under risk, people choose between options whose out-
comes may differ in valence (positive or negative), in magnitudes, and
in probabilities (e.g., various medical treatments may differ in their
probabilities of positive and negative effects; a financial investment
promises to yield a higher but less probable reward than another one).
Therefore, lotteries involving probabilistic outcomes can provide a
useful test bed to investigate if and how younger and older adults
differ in their perception of risk and reward.
In the present research, we investigated differences between
younger and older adults in decisions with real and hypothetical
monetary rewards that differed in magnitude using a well-established
set of risky decision problems (Holt & Laury, 2002). The comparison
of real and hypothetical rewards is methodologically and conceptually
informative: So far, most studies on aging and decision making have
used tasks in which monetary incentives were either low or merely
hypothetical (i.e., people's decisions did not have any consequences).
It is currently unclear if findings of age-related differences from stud-
ies with hypothetical decision scenarios generalize to decision-making
scenarios with real and larger monetary rewards. Conceptually, the
comparison between real and hypothetical reward effects may also
inform us about the relevance of monetary rewards for younger and
older adults and how this may affect different aspects of decision
making (e.g., people's preferences and the decision quality). In what
follows, we briefly review the literature on incentive effects
(almost exclusively with students/younger adults), discuss possible
age-related differences in decisions with real and hypothetical
rewards, and then present our study in which we orthogonally manip-
ulated reward type (hypothetical vs. real) and reward magnitude in
younger and older adults.
1.1 | Real and hypothetical rewards: Younger
adults
In their review of financial incentives effects in experiments, Camerer
and Hogarth (1999, p. 7) noted that the assumed role of incentives for
human behavior is a “dividing line between economics and other
social sciences, particularly psychology.” The authors reported a
search in the journal American Economic Review (studies between
1970 and 1997) that “did not turn up a single published experimental
study in which subjects were not paid according to performance”
(p. 31). Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) examined the publications in the
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making1 in a 10-year period (from 1988
to 1997). They found that only 48 (26%) of 186 studies employed
financial incentives and that merely 10 studies (5%) systematically
manipulated payment schemes (e.g., payment vs. nonpayment condi-
tions). These numbers highlight the different experimental conven-
tions across scientific fields that reflect different assumptions about
the role of incentives for decision behavior (see Hertwig &
Ortmann, 2001, for an overview).
On the one hand, economists have commonly assumed that par-
ticipants invest more effort and work more effectively, if they receive
higher monetary reward for better performance. Smith and
Walker (1993) surveyed the studies in experimental economics
and found that rewards consistently reduced the variance of decision
error. A field study using large real monetary outcomes by
Binswanger (1980) with farmers in rural India indicated that virtually
all participants showed at least moderate risk aversion that tended to
increase when rewards were increased. Holt and Laury (2002) found
that a sample of younger adults (83% students) and of some middle-
aged adults (17% business-school faculty) made similar choices
between risky lotteries with hypothetical and real low incentives.
However, participants increased their choices of a safer option when
incentives were real and high. Several studies from experimental psy-
chology also indicate differential effects of real and hypothetical
incentives: Edwards (1953) reported differences in decisions when
participants gambled for real money and when participants just
imagined what they would do if they were gambling. Siegel and
Goldstein (1959) reported that participants' predictions regarding two
possible events in a Bernoulli process changed significantly when
financial incentives were provided. Slovic (1969) found that under-
graduate participants tended to maximize gains when choices among
lotteries were hypothetical but were more cautious and focused on
loss avoidance when outcomes were real. These and other classic
studies suggest that incentives can have profound effects on younger
adults' decisions.
On the other hand, researchers in the fields of psychology and
behavioral decision making have frequently assumed that participants
are in motivational and cognitive states that allow experimenters to
collect reasonably representative samples of decision behavior even
in the absence of financial incentives. For instance, many investiga-
tions in the tradition of the “heuristics and biases” research program
have relied on hypothetical decision scenarios. As noted by Kahneman
and Tversky (1979, p. 265), “[…] the method of hypothetical choices
emerges as the simplest procedure by which a large number of theo-
retical questions can be investigated. The use of the method relies on
the assumption that people often know how they would behave in
actual situations of choice, and on the further assumption that the
subjects have no special reason to disguise their true preferences.” In
line with this, there are also a considerable number of studies that
have found only minor or no differences in decision behavior with real
and hypothetical incentives. Beattie and Loomes (1997), for example,
compared pairwise choices in real and hypothetical lotteries and
reported no differences in a sample of students. Some context effects
that have been investigated with hypothetical scenarios (e.g., the
attraction or decoy effect: adding an inferior option to a choice set
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induces changes in preferences for other options) have also been
found with real choices (e.g., Simonson & Tversky, 1992). Kühberger
et al. (2002) found similar framing effects (people's tendency to avoid
risks in positively framed scenarios and to seek risks in negatively
framed scenarios) with hypothetical and real choices. Camerer and
Hogarth (1999) reported in their review of 74 experiments comparing
the behavior of participants who received no, low, or high financial
performance-based incentives that the most frequent finding was that
the form of incentivization had no effect on mean performance.
Taken together, the findings suggest that the effects of incentives
are complex and mixed. Thus, the extreme positions that
incentives never make a difference or always affect decision behavior
appear untenable (Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). Incentive effects likely
depend on characteristics of the task and on the aspects of decision
behavior that are studied: Camerer and Hogarth conclude that finan-
cial incentives usually reduce variability or noise in responses
(cf. Smith & Walker, 1993) and particularly affect performance when
attention and mental effort are relevant (e.g., for learning, judgment,
and clerical tasks). In contrast, they conclude that in preferential
choice and “in the kinds of tasks economists are most interested in,
like trading in markets, bargaining in games and choosing among risky
gambles, the overwhelming finding is that increased incentives do not
change average behavior substantively” (p. 8; see also Locey
et al., 2011; Madden et al., 2003; Taylor, 2013). Thus, to gain a better
understanding of age-related differences in decisions between proba-
bilistic options, it seems important to systematically compare the role
of real and hypothetical incentives (i.e., to follow a “do-it-both-ways”
approach; cf. Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001). We are not aware of any
empirical attempts that have done so in the area of decision making
and aging. In the next section, we discuss if and how real and
hypothetical rewards may differentially affect choice patterns and
preferences across adulthood.
1.2 | Adult age differences in decisions with real
and hypothetical rewards
In the current research, we considered two aspects of decision
behavior that can be affected by reward, namely, decision quality
(value maximization and variability) and people's preferences among
probabilistic options. Based on previous research (e.g., Camerer &
Hogarth, 1999), it is conceivable that rewards may differentially
impact these aspects of decision behavior (e.g., relatively little impact
on people's preferences, but possibly larger effects on decision quality
and consistency). This impact may also differ with age. Furthermore,
we had a secondary interest to explore if reward type and magnitude
impact participants' arousal and affective state.
1.2.1 | Decision quality
Several studies suggest that older adults make poorer choices among
probabilistic options than younger adults (for overviews, see Hess
et al., 2015; Peters et al., 2007; Weller et al., 2011). Specifically, there
is evidence that older adults' choices are often noisier, are less consis-
tent, and show more violations of first-order stochastic dominance2
than younger adults' choices (Tymula et al., 2013). Research with
younger adults suggests that choice variability tends to decrease
when higher payoffs are at stake. For instance, decision makers may
balance the monetary consequences against the effort or cognitive
cost of reducing error in their choices (Smith & Walker, 1993). The
cost of cognitive engagement may rise with age in response to
normative cognitive decline: Given that fluid cognitive abilities
(e.g., Lindenberger et al., 1993; Verhaeghen & Salthouse, 1997) and
numerical abilities (Peters et al., 2007) decline with age, older adults
may have to invest relatively more cognitive engagement in choices
between probabilistic lotteries. Lotteries can be viewed as multi-
dimensional stimuli that comprise different pieces of information
(i.e., probabilities and outcomes; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968), whose
consideration likely require fluid cognitive and numerical abilities that
decrease with age. This implies that older adults might have relatively
higher cognitive cost than younger adults to achieve similar levels of
decision quality. In line with this proposition, older adults tend to
avoid informational complexity in preferential and multi-attribute
decisions (e.g., Zilker et al., 2020). Thus, when rewards are merely
hypothetical or low (relative to the required cognitive effort),
particularly older adults might find the monetary consequences not to
be worth the cognitive effort. In contrast, with higher and real
rewards, older adults might be more motivated to process the relevant
information despite relatively high cognitive costs.
Taken together, these considerations lead to the prediction that
the quality of choices between probabilistic options increases with
real and high reward, particularly for older adults.
1.2.2 | Risk preference
Apart from decision quality, rewards may affect people's preferences.
Risk preference (the extent to which people avoid or seek variability
in possible outcomes) has been shown to be sensitive to several fac-
tors, including the magnitude of reward (e.g., younger adults tend to
be more risk-averse when reward is very high; Holt & Laury, 2002).
Some studies suggest that older adults are more risk-averse than
younger adults in the domain of gains (e.g., Best & Charness, 2015;
Tymula et al., 2013; Weller et al., 2011) and typically prefer smaller
sure gains over larger riskier gains (Mather et al., 2012). Overall,
however, research on aging and risk preferences has yielded mixed
findings. One likely reason is that risk preferences vary strongly across
tasks and domains (e.g., Figner & Weber, 2011; Mamerow
et al., 2016; Reyna, 2011; Roalf et al., 2012; Rolison et al., 2014). For
instance, age differences in risk taking emerge in some tasks involving
decisions from experience (when outcomes and their frequencies
must be learned), whereas younger and older adults often show
similar risk taking in decisions from description (when outcomes and
probabilities are described, e.g., in monetary lotteries) (Mamerow
et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2011). Other task characteristics likely affect
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the size of age differences as well (e.g., the number of options in the
choice set: Frey et al., 2015; whether one of the options provides a
certain outcome: Kellen et al., 2017; Zilker et al., 2020).
Another factor, which has received little attention so far, is the
reward structure. Mata et al. (2011) noted in their meta-analysis of
age differences in risky choice that participants received
performance-contingent payoffs in only 28% of the studies and
suggested that “performance-contingent payment in future research
could help ensure that any age-related differences found are not due
to unclear reward structures or varying effects of hypothetical
payoffs” (p. 26). Following this notion, a further aim in the current
study was to compare younger and older adults' risk preferences
when real and high monetary rewards are at stake.
In decisions from description between probabilistic options,
adult age differences in risk taking are not necessarily expected
(e.g., Mamerow et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2011). However, could
rewards differentially affect risk preferences in younger and older
adults? There are two possible scenarios: As one scenario, striving
for monetary reward could be less relevant for older than younger
adults. On average, older adults have accumulated more wealth in
their lives than younger adults (e.g., Davies & Shorrocks, 2000),
decreasing the relative value of additional monetary gains. In con-
trast, younger adults are typically in a life phase in which they
have to accumulate resources they can invest into their future
(Freund & Riediger, 2001) and to seize opportunities for gain and
growth (e.g., Ravert et al., 2019). For example, Freund and
Blanchard-Fields (2014) found that younger participants were more
likely than older participants to keep money they had earned
during an experiment for themselves, whereas older adults were
more likely to donate it to a good cause. This scenario implies a
relatively stronger change in preferences between hypothetical and
real rewards (e.g., increases in risk aversion) for younger than for
older adults (i.e., age  reward type interactions). Moreover, to the
extent that people tend to be more risk-averse when reward
increases (Holt & Laury, 2002), one would expect to find effects of
reward magnitude on risk taking.
As an alternative scenario, reward type may influence decision
quality, but not necessarily people's preferences (see Camerer &
Hogarth, 1999). For instance, a few studies have investigated adult
age differences in preferential discounting decisions with different
types of positive consequences (hypothetical money and real liquid
rewards/favorite drinks; Jimura et al., 2011) or negative conse-
quences (electrical shocks; Löckenhoff et al., 2016). Even though
Löckenhoff et al. (2016) did not experimentally manipulate hypo-
thetical and real consequences, the pattern of preferential choices
across two separate studies with either real or imagined aversive
events was similar. Therefore, if younger and older adults are able
to anticipate sufficiently accurately how they would behave in
actual situations of choice, the pattern of preferences in both age
groups with real rewards would also be expected to emerge with
hypothetical rewards. Here, we aimed to investigate which of these
scenarios accounts best for younger and older adults' monetary
choices.
2 | THE CURRENT STUDY
To examine the impact of reward type and magnitude on decision qual-
ity and preferences across adulthood, we asked participants to make
choices between two options with probabilistic outcomes using a well-
established set of monetary lotteries as our starting point. This facili-
tates comparison of the current findings with a wealth of previous
research on younger adults' decisions from description. Moreover, both
options were of similar informational complexity, which prevents poten-
tial confounds in stimulus materials related to age differences in the
ability to deal with many pieces of information (e.g., Zilker et al., 2020).
3 | METHOD
3.1 | Design and sample
The 2  2  2 design included the between-subject factor age group
(younger and older adults), the within-subject factors reward type
(hypothetical vs. real), and reward magnitude (low vs. high). In the
hypothetical conditions, participants were instructed to imagine
the outcomes as if they played for real money; they were informed
about the wins they would have received with their randomly selected
choice and outcome, but the wins were not actually paid out. In the
real reward conditions, people were explicitly informed that they
played for real money and received their wins in cash after the study.
In the low-reward conditions, possible gains ranged from CHF 0.10 to
3.85 (0.11–4.25 USD); in the high-reward conditions, possible gains
were scaled up by factor 20 and ranged from CHF 2 to 77 (2.21–85
USD). Each participant completed four rounds, each including
10 binary-choice lottery problems. To avoid experimentally induced
wealth effects, all participants started with the hypothetical reward
conditions (cf. Holt & Laury, 2002). The order of the low and high
rewards was counterbalanced across participants.
Twenty-nine younger adults (20–29 years) and 36 older adults
(61–82 years) participated in the study (Online Supplement 4 includes
details about sample-size planning). Details about participant charac-
teristics are in Table 1. Scores from cognitive tests and questionnaires
with age-group comparisons are in Table 2. As expected, younger
adults scored higher than older adults in tests of processing speed and
numeracy, whereas older adults scored higher in vocabulary (semantic
knowledge) than younger adults. In line with previous research using
self-reports of motivational orientation (Ebner et al., 2006), older
adults indicated a stronger orientation toward maintenance and
avoiding losses in their personal goals than younger adults. There were
no age-group differences on other measures (0.30 < BFs10 < 3).
Further details about the test scales are in the Supporting Information.
3.2 | Procedure and materials
Between one and three participants per session were seated in sepa-
rated cubicles in a quiet laboratory room. A trained experimenter then
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gave standardized instructions for the subsequent decision task that
comprised four rounds of lottery choice problems that are frequently
used in experimental economics and decision research (Holt &
Laury, 2002). The options in the Holt and Laury task differ systemati-
cally in expected value and in variability of the outcomes (risk level).
That is, the possible outcomes for Option A are less variable than the
possible outcomes of Option B (see Table 3). In the first problem of
the set (top row in the table), the probability of the high outcome in
both options is .10; only persons with extreme appetite for risk would
choose Option B. When the probability of the high outcome increases
enough (moving down the rows of Table 3), a person would eventually
cross over to Option B. For example, a risk-neutral person who
intends to maximize expected value would choose Option A in the
top four decision problems (#1 to #4) before switching to Option B in
the other problems (#5 to #10). Even the most risk-averse person
should switch over by decision #10 in the bottom row, because
Option B yields a sure outcome that is higher than the sure outcome
of Option A.
We closely followed the procedures and instructions described
by Holt and Laury: On each round, participants marked on a paper
sheet, in any order they wished, which of two options (A or B) they
preferred for each of 10 lottery choice problems. After participants
had completed their decisions, one decision (out of 10) was randomly
selected by rolling a die. Participants were asked to roll the die them-
selves (by using a dice cup), and this procedure was supervised by a
trained experimenter. The experimenter then marked the selected
row (decision) on the sheet. In a second step, participants rolled the
die again to determine the outcome and reward for the selected
option. The Supporting Information include verbatim instructions and
test materials. Each participant completed four different sheets across
the four rounds of the decision task. In each round, participants were
given no hint to expect additional rounds of the decision task.
Participants finally completed questionnaires, a short test battery at a
computer, and were debriefed. The achieved gains from the lotteries
were paid out in cash at the end of a session (total duration approxi-
mately 45 min). The study was in accordance with the guidelines of
the institute ethics review board, did not involve any deception, and
all participants provided written informed consent. Open data are
available at https://osf.io/rg7tk.
4 | RESULTS
We used Bayesian analysis of variance (BANOVA) to quantify the
evidence for the presence or absence of main and interaction
effects of the experimental factors Reward Type, Reward Magnitude,
and of Age Group on decision behavior (achieved gains, decision
quality, risk preferences; the dependent decision variables are in
Table 2). The analyses of effects of these predictor variables on
decision behavior were based on model averaging (Hinne et al.,
2020; Wagenmakers et al., 2018). That is, in a first step, the differ-
ent possible models (including all possible combinations of main
and interaction effects on a dependent variable) were computed. In
a second step, the evidence for the inclusion (or exclusion) of a
specific effect was quantified by comparing the performance of all
models that included that effect to the performance of all the
models that did not include that effect. The goal of model averag-
ing is to deal with model-selection uncertainty by considering the
conclusions from all candidate models, weighted by the plausibility
of each model given the data. Detailed lists for each effect and
dependent variable are in Tables S1–S10. In the following analyses,
we report the estimated sizes of an effect (ηp
2) and Bayes factors
(BFinclusion) to quantify the strength of evidence in the data for the
inclusion of that effect averaged across models (conversely,
BFexclusion = 1/BFinclusion quantifies the evidence for exclusion of an
effect). We follow conventional practices in our interpretation of
BFs.3 All analyses used vaguely informative reference specifications
of prior distributions.4
4.1 | Achieved gains
Overall, younger and older adults did not differ in achieved monetary
gains after the study (Ms = 48 and 49 CHF, respectively). Further
analysis of effects only supported inclusion of the factor Reward
Magnitude. That is, people expectedly achieved more gains in the
high- than low-reward conditions (BFinclusion > 100). However, neither
age group nor any of the other experimental factors or their interac-
tions affected gains; there was even moderate evidence for the null
hypothesis (no effect on decision-contingent gains), suggesting the
exclusion of any further factors (6.05 > BFsexclusion > 3.74).









Obligatory school 1 0
Vocational training/apprenticeship 0 14
High school/college 18 11






Notes: Frequency of participants (n) as a function of sample characteristics.
Income = self-reported yearly income  1000 in CHF; four younger and
three older adults did not provide information about their income, and
information about gender from two older adults was unavailable. The age
groups did not differ in the distribution of gender [χ2(1) < 1, BF10 = .44],
but in education level [χ2(4) = 20.71] and income distribution [χ2(2)
= 15.84], BFs10 > 100.
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TABLE 2 Cognitive, motivational, and decision-task variables
M SE
BF10Younger adults Older adults Younger adults Older adults
Age (years) 23.83 70.14 .49 1.11
Numeracy (0–11) 9.82 7.67 .22 .50 41.64
Vocabulary (0–93) 29.97 32.83 .46 .36 >100
Cognitive speed (0–93) 41.83 24.53 1.20 .74 >100
Health (1–7) 5.59 5.33 .21 .18 0.36
Life satisfaction (1–7) 5.69 5.56 .17 .15 0.30
Reported risk taking (1–11) 5.86 6.36 .43 .31 0.38
Gain orientation (1–8) 6.83 6.39 .24 .25 0.49
Maintenance orientation (1–8) 5.10 6.18 .30 .30 3.54
Loss orientation (1–8) 4.40 6.56 .44 .27 >100
Decision quality: EV-max.
Hypothetical, low .80 .73 .03 .03 0.66
Hypothetical, high .79 .70 .02 .03 1.30
Real, low .80 .78 .03 .03 0.27
Real, high .71 .74 .03 .03 0.31
Decision quality: noise
Hypothetical, low .13 .27 .02 .04 6.70
Hypothetical, high .12 .29 .01 .04 71.44
Real, low .12 .18 .02 .02 1.64
Real, high .13 .22 .02 .03 1.87
Risk aversion
Hypothetical, low .53 .46 .04 .03 0.66
Hypothetical, high .59 .52 .03 .03 1.04
Real, low .55 .48 .04 .03 0.55
Real, high .67 .56 .03 .03 3.47
Affect (1–9)
Hypothetical, low 7.17 6.92 .19 .28 0.32
Hypothetical, high 7.31 7.06 .21 .26 0.32
Real, low 7.24 7.56 .20 .25 0.37
Real, high 7.55 7.75 .23 .27 0.29
Arousal (1–9)
Hypothetical, low 3.31 3.92 .34 .38 0.45
Hypothetical, high 3.76 4.14 .39 .41 0.31
Real, low 3.41 4.22 .33 .45 0.57
Real, high 4.21 4.56 .43 .44 0.29
Achieved total gains (in CHF) 47.84 48.79 3.87 4.55 0.26
Gains hypothetical, low 2.43 2.09 .24 .23 0.39
Gains hypothetical, high 46.59 50.86 4.05 4.60 0.31
Gains real, low 2.25 2.56 .23 .19 0.41
Gains real, high 45.59 46.22 3.89 4.53 0.26
Proportion of gains donated .21 .29 .04 .05 0.45
Notes: For rating and test scales, minimum and maximum possible values are in parentheses in the left column; EV-max. = proportion of choices (out of 10)
of lottery with higher expected value; decision noise = proportion of switches (out of 9) in the decision task; risk aversion = proportion of choices (out of
10) of lottery with lower outcome variability; achieved gains = total earnings from the decision task in CHF (1CHF 1.10 USD); a participant strictly
following expected-value maximization would be expected to gain 55.53 CHF on average; affect and arousal were measured after each decision phase
with the self-assessment manikin scales; BF10 = evidence that the age groups differ on a given variable; further details about test scales for vocabulary,
cognitive speed, numeracy, and motivational orientation are in the Supporting Information.
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4.2 | Decision quality: Value maximization
Next, we analyzed the frequency with which participants chose the
option in a decision problem with the highest expected value EV¼
P
xipi (where xi and pi are the amount of money and probability,
respectively, associated with the outcomes of that option). Value
maximization has been used frequently as a benchmark to assess the
quality of people's decisions under risk (e.g., Dhami et al., 2011;
Pachur et al., 2017; Tymula et al., 2013). As can be seen in Figure 1,
participants' choices were clearly sensitive to EV: The probability of
choosing the safer Option A dropped systematically with increasing
attractiveness of the alternative Option B (Table 3 lists the EVs of
both options).
However, the effects of the experimental manipulations on value
maximization were relatively subtle, in line with the observation that
both age groups gained similar monetary amounts. Nonetheless, as
TABLE 3 Characteristics of the
choice problems presented to
participants
# Option A Option B EVA EVB SDA SDB CVA CVB
1 40, 0.1; 32, 0.9 77, 0.1; 2, 0.9 32.8 9.5 2.4 22.5 7.3 236.8
2 40, 0.2; 32, 0.8 77, 0.2; 2, 0.8 33.6 17.0 3.2 30.0 9.5 176.5
3 40, 0.3; 32, 0.7 77, 0.3; 2, 0.7 34.4 24.5 3.7 34.4 10.7 140.3
4 40, 0.4; 32, 0.6 77, 0.4; 2, 0.6 35.2 32.0 3.9 36.7 11.1 114.8
5 40, 0.5; 32, 0.5 77, 0.5; 2, 0.5 36.0 39.5 4.0 37.5 11.1 94.9
6 40, 0.6; 32, 0.4 77, 0.6; 2, 0.4 36.8 47.0 3.9 36.7 10.6 78.2
7 40, 0.7; 32, 0.3 77, 0.7; 2, 0.3 37.6 54.5 3.7 34.4 9.8 63.1
8 40, 0.8; 32, 0.2 77, 0.8; 2, 0.2 38.4 62.0 3.2 30.0 8.3 48.4
9 40, 0.9; 32, 0.1 77, 0.9; 2, 0.1 39.2 69.5 2.4 22.5 6.1 32.4
10 40, 1.0; 32, 0.0 77, 1.0; 2, 0.0 40.0 77.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Notes: Option pairs for each of the 10 choice problems used in the study, with each option (x1, p1; x2, p2)
offering outcome x1 with probability p1 and outcome x2 with probability p2 = 1  p1. The table shows
the outcome values for the high-reward condition (paid out in cash in CHF; 1 CHF 1.1 USD); in the




Abbreviations: CV, coefficient of variation, CV¼ SD
EV
100; EV, expected value; SD, standard deviation of
outcomes.
F IGURE 1 Proportion of choices of the safer Option A as a function of decision problem, age group, and condition. A decision maker who
maximizes expected value would choose the safer Option in decision problems #1 to #4 and then switch to the riskier Option B in problems #5 to
#10. Younger and older adults were sensitive to expected value and tended to avoid risk. The 10 decision problems are listed in Table 3
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Table 2 indicates, older adults' decision quality was descriptively lower
than younger adults' in both hypothetical reward conditions, but not
in both real reward conditions. Real rewards tended to enhance older
adults' decision quality more than younger adults'. In line with this, an
analysis of effects with BANOVAs indicated moderate evidence for
an Age  Reward Type interaction (BFinclusion = 4.34, ηp
2
= .09). The
evidence for any further effects was either ambiguous or supported
their exclusion (6.37 > BFsexclusion > 0.37).
4.3 | Decision quality: Noise
Next, we analyzed people's switches between safer and riskier
options in the presented set of choice problems as an indicator of
decision noise. If participants have monotonic preferences, they pre-
fer the safer option up to a certain level and then switch to preferring
the riskier option in all subsequent rows in the choice table (Table 3).
In line with previous research, the majority of participants chose the
safer Option A when the probability of the higher reward was small
and then crossed over once to Option B when the probability of the
higher reward increased, without switching back to Option
A. However, some participants switched several times between safer
and riskier options in the set of choice problems, indicating noise or
stochasticity in decision making (Holt & Laury, 2002). Table 2 shows
the proportions of switches as a function of age group and condition.
Analyses of effects indicated that older adults made more volatile
choices than younger adults, BFinclusion = 30.53, ηp
2
= .16, and
switched more frequently between safer and riskier options in their
decisions. This dovetails with previous research, indicating age-related
increases in stochasticity in decision making (Tymula et al., 2013).
Notably, there was also evidence for effects of Reward Type
(BFinclusion = 22.47, ηp
2
= .17) that were qualified by an
Age  Reward Type interaction (BFinclusion = 15.11, ηp
2
= .17). Older
adults switched more frequently than younger adults in the hypotheti-
cal reward conditions; this was not the case in the real reward
conditions. Evidence was either ambiguous or supported exclusion of
any further effects (4.56 > BFsexclusion > 2.35).
Even though the level of stochasticity was higher in older than
younger adults' choices, this does not mean older adults were behav-
ing at random or failing to understand the situation they encountered.
If participants behaved at random, they would choose the two options
with equal probability of .50 and be insensitive to reward magnitudes
and outcome probabilities. This was clearly not the case: Both
younger and older adults' choice probabilities in the decision problems
deviated substantially from.50 (all BFs > 100), except for the decision
problems around the switching point (problems #5 to #6)
We further examined people's choices when one option was
objectively better than the other (i.e., in decision problem #10, in
which both options offered a sure outcome without any trade-offs
between value and probability). Although experimental research
shows that people do not always choose stochastically dominant
lotteries (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), little is known about age-
related differences in dominance violations. In the current study, there
was evidence for age differences in the frequency of dominance
violations, χ2(1, N = 65) = 5.73, BF10 = 7.03. We found that 25% of
the older adults chose a lower valued option (in at least one of the
four conditions) that was dominated by a higher valued option; in
contrast, only 3.45% of the younger adults showed such violations. In
line with previous research (Tymula et al., 2013), this suggests that
dominance violations increase with age.
4.4 | Risk preference
To quantify risk aversion (a decision maker's distaste for options with
higher variability in possible outcomes), we analyzed the proportion of
choices of safer options among the presented problems (Holt &
Laury, 2002). Figure 1 shows the proportion of choices of Option A
(whose outcome variability was always lower than that of Option B)
as a function of decision problem, experimental condition, and age
group. A decision maker who maximizes expected value would choose
the safer Option A in choice problems #1 to #4 and choose the riskier
Option B in problems #5 to #10. (Figure 2 shows the distributions of
participants over the number of safer option choices).
Analysis of effects showed that there was very strong evidence
for an effect of reward magnitude on risk aversion, BFinclusion > 100,
ηp
2
= .19, indicating that people chose the safer option more
frequently when rewards were higher (CHF 2–77) than lower (CHF
0.10–3.85). The evidence was only equivocal or supported
exclusion of further main effects or interactions in the models
(4.79 > BFsexclusion > 0.33). Despite these experimental manipulations,
there was also evidence for moderately high rank-order stability of
people's risk aversion across the four conditions (rounds) of the
decision task (with rank-correlation coefficients τ ranging from .27 to
.49; all BFs10 > 19), suggesting that people who chose safer options
more frequently than riskier options in one round also tended to do
so in the other rounds (Supplement 5 includes further details).
4.5 | Affect and arousal
After each round of decisions, participants provided ratings of their
current affective state (1 = very negative; 9 = very positive) and
arousal (1 = very calm; 9 = very excited). We were thus able to explore
to what extent the experimental manipulations of reward type and
reward magnitude might influence participants' reported affect
and level of activation. These analyses, however, were exploratory,
and we did not formulate specific hypotheses in advance.
Regarding affect, analysis of effects indicated that the type of
reward influenced the ratings: Participants reported higher positive
affect5 in the real than hypothetical conditions, BFinclusion > 100,
ηp
2
= .15; there was no evidence for further effects,
4.82 > BFsexclusion > 0.45. Regarding arousal, people reported higher
ratings when rewards were high than low, BFinclusion = 27.96,
ηp
2
= .18; there was no evidence for further effects,
4.76 > BFsexclusion > 0.38.
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4.6 | Relations with cognitive variables
Finally, we explored the relations between the decision variables (i.e.,
decision quality, decision noise, risk preferences, and achieved gains)
and further cognitive and motivational variables that we collected in
tests and questionnaires after the decision task. We did not find
systematic correlations, except between numeracy and indicators of
decision noise (switching between options and dominance violations).
That is, for younger adults, we found negative correlations between
amount of switching and numeracy in three of the four experimental
conditions (smallest r > .49, smallest BF10 > 7) and for older adults in
all conditions (all r > .44, all BFs10 > 7). Further correlational path ana-
lyses with both numeracy and cognitive speed as indicators of fluid
cognitive ability suggested that numeracy scores (but not speed
scores) could statistically account for the age-related differences in
switching (see Supplement 2). Moreover, participants' frequency of
dominance violations was associated with their scoring (below
vs. above 50% correct) in the numeracy test, χ2(1, N = 65) = 23.68,
BF10 > 100.
5 | DISCUSSION
The current study systematically compared age-related differences in
choices between options with real and hypothetical probabilistic
reward of low and high magnitude. Younger and older adults did not
differ in achieved earnings and expected-value maximization.
However, in line with previous research (e.g., Tymula et al., 2013),
older adults' choices were less consistent than younger adults'.
Numerical abilities (scores in a numeracy test) correlated with these
decision inconsistencies.
Overall, there was more evidence for the equivalence of real and
hypothetical reward effects on the decisions by younger and older
adults. Importantly, however, older adults' decision inconsistencies
decreased markedly when real rewards were at stake. In particular,
real rewards reduced switching between options and dominance vio-
lations in older adults, whereas younger adults showed similarly low
levels of decision inconsistencies across the different reward condi-
tions. At the same time, we found typical age differences in test
scores of cognitive speed and of numeracy (Table 2), which correlated
with decision quality. This pattern is in line with the idea that older
adults have more difficulties than younger adults to process the rele-
vant information in decisions under risk—which mainly affects their
decision quality and not their preferences (cf. Olschewski et al., 2018,
for evidence that cognitive-load manipulations predominantly affect
choice consistency rather than preferences). Therefore, one interpre-
tation of this finding is that due to age-related decline in fluid and
numerical abilities (Lindenberger et al., 1993; Peters et al., 2007),
reducing errors in probabilistic choices requires more effort for older
than younger adults and that older adults invest the additional effort
only when real rewards are at stake. Thus, rewards might have
provided a form of compensation for older adults' relatively higher
effort cost (cf. Smith & Walker, 1993) to reach similar levels of
decision quality as younger adults.
Regarding risk preferences, we found only an effect of reward
magnitude: Both younger and older adults chose safer options more
frequently when rewards were higher than lower (cf. Holt &
Laury, 2002). The lack of age-related differences in risk taking (with
simultaneous age differences in numeracy and processing speed) in
the current study is consistent with previous findings, suggesting that
age differences in probabilistic choice depend on characteristics of
the decision task and the stimuli. For instance, several studies have
also found no age differences in decisions from description under risk
(e.g., Mamerow et al., 2016; Mata et al., 2011), particularly for choices
between options of similar complexity (Zilker et al., 2020). Notably,
participants' risk taking in the current study did not change when real
rewards were provided instead of hypothetical rewards. This bears a
striking resemblance to findings by Kühberger et al. (2002) on the
framing effect in risky choice with real and hypothetical rewards. In
one of the few experiments so far that systematically compared
reward type and magnitude in a sample of younger adults, Kühberger
et al. (2002) found that the framing effect depended on reward mag-
nitude for real rewards, whereas participants' hypothetical choices
matched real choices for low and high rewards. The current study
F IGURE 2 Proportion of younger adults (filled bars) and older
adults (unfilled bars) classified as risk-seeking (black) and risk-averse
(gray) as a function of experimental condition. The number of choices
of the safer option increased in both age groups in the high-reward
conditions
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revealed a similar pattern for younger and older adults' risk prefer-
ences as a function of reward type and magnitude. This highlights the
importance of distinguishing between the reality status (real
vs. hypothetical) and the magnitude of reward, which are often
confounded in the literature, but may affect choice differentially.
The lack of an effect of reward type may appear surprising,
because the rewards offered in a hypothetical scenario are only imagi-
nary. One explanation is that the magnitude of reward primarily
affects the anticipation process of future outcomes, which is relevant
for both hypothetical and real choice. Kühberger et al. (2002) noted
that decision making could be viewed as “hypothetical in its very
core” (p. 1163) because any outcomes are present only as hypotheti-
cal future events at the time a choice is made. The current findings
suggest that both younger and older adults are able to anticipate
reasonably accurately in hypothetical scenarios how they behave in
actual scenarios of choice. This does not imply that decisions in
general can be studied hypothetically with satisfactory external
validity, because the anticipation of future outcomes is only one
aspect in the decision process. Whereas a decision maker's state
remains unaffected in hypothetical scenarios, real rewards will change
the state of a person at some point. It is conceivable that knowledge
of this difference affects further aspects of decision making. For
instance, the present findings show that reward type does not neces-
sarily affect the preferences that people express, but it may affect the
variability and consistency of their choices.
5.1 | Limitations and outlook
To take a first step to systematically compare the effect of real and
imagined rewards on younger and older adults' decisions and to
facilitate comparisons with the majority of previous studies on
decisions under risk, we focused on monetary outcomes (Holt &
Laury, 2002) in the present experiment. As a potential limitation, it
remains unclear to what extent the findings generalize to decisions
with nonmonetary outcomes (e.g., Lejarraga et al., 2016; von
Helversen et al., 2020) and other types of decision tasks. Regarding
risk taking, for instance, we found medium-sized rank correlations
across the different experimental conditions in our study, in line with
the notion that people have moderately stable risk-taking propensities
(e.g., Frey et al., 2017; Josef et al., 2016). However, multimethod
investigations of risk-taking behavior have also found substantial
task-specific variance in decision behavior, challenging the view that
people's preferences can be stably measured across different behav-
ioral tasks (Pedroni et al., 2017). There is also aging research
suggesting that younger and older adults' preferences may vary across
different decision tasks: Seaman et al. (2018) compared three types of
discounting decisions (effort, probability, and time discounting) and
found no correlations across tasks in people's discount rates; Jimura
et al. (2011) found that young adults discounted hypothetical mone-
tary rewards more steeply than older adults, but this pattern reversed
with consumable liquid rewards, indicating that the type of reward
may differentially affect preferences as a function of age. Such
findings raise important questions about the utility of monetary incen-
tives across adulthood compared with other nonmonetary incentives.
In the current study, we found no evidence that monetary outcomes
were less relevant for older than younger adults; nonetheless, it
remains an important research endeavor to better understand how
the utility of different incentives may change across adulthood due to
changes in motivational orientation (Freund & Blanchard-Fields, 2014;
Horn & Freund, 2021; Mayr & Freund, 2020; Ravert et al., 2019).
Given that hypothetical and real rewards may come in many forms, it
is an interesting avenue for further investigations to compare their
effects across different types of decisions and outcomes.
5.2 | Conclusion
The present research aimed to delineate effects of reward magnitude
and type (real vs. hypothetical) on younger and older adults' monetary
decisions, following a “do-it-both-ways” approach (Hertwig &
Ortmann, 2001). The findings highlight the need to distinguish
between the reality status and magnitude of rewards and show that
rewards can differentially impact aspects of choice behavior: Real and
high rewards improved older adults' decision quality; in contrast, both
younger and older adults' risk preferences showed a similar pattern
across hypothetical and real scenarios. This is in line with the notion
that reward may particularly affect those aspects of decision behavior
that benefit from increased effort or attention (e.g., decision quality),
whereas reward may not necessarily shift people's preference
(Camerer & Hogarth, 1999). Taken together, the current findings
portray a fairly optimistic picture regarding the use of hypothetical
scenarios to study monetary decisions. With carefully prepared
instructions in hypothetical scenarios, people from different age
groups indicate preferences that generalize to situations with real
rewards. Nonetheless, rewards may help to improve decision quality
(reduction of decision noise/variability), which correlated with
numerical abilities in the present study.
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ENDNOTES
1 Samples from the journals American Economic Review and Journal of
Behavioral Decision Making were chosen by the authors of these reviews
(Camerer & Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig & Ortmann, 2001) because they
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were perceived as reasonably representative outlets reflecting the
experimental practices at that time by economists and behavioral deci-
sion researchers, respectively.
2 Stochastic dominance refers to an order between random variables,
where one lottery (i.e., a probability distribution over possible outcomes)
can be ranked as superior to another lottery. For example, if 1 USD is
added to one or more outcomes of a given lottery, the new lottery domi-
nates the old lottery because it yields higher payoff, regardless of spe-
cific numbers realized by that lottery.
3 A Bayes factor (BF) compares the likelihood of the data under one model
M1 (e.g., a model assuming a relation between two variables) to that
under another model M0 (e.g., a model assuming no such relation). BF
thus quantifies the degree to which the obtained data should change
one's prior beliefs about these models. The subscript in the Bayes factor
notation indicates the model supported by the data: BF10 indicates the
Bayes factor in favor of M1 over M0, whereas BF01 (BF01 = 1/BF10) indi-
cates the Bayes factor in favor of M0 over M1. BFs10 larger than 10 or
100 are usually interpreted to indicate “strong” or “extreme” evidence
for M1, respectively; conversely, BFs10 smaller than 0.1 or 0.01 would
indicate “strong” or “extreme” evidence, respectively, for the null model
M0; BFs between 1/3 and 3 are usually interpreted to indicate only
equivocal evidence (for further details, see Wagenmakers et al., 2018).
4 Our prior distributional assumptions for the BANOVA models followed
default reference specifications (Wagenmakers et al., 2018). That is, for
the calculation of Bayes factors for fixed effects, we relied on the com-
mon Jeffreys–Zellner–Siow scheme that assumes a multivariate Cauchy
prior distribution (because we did not include random effects or
covariates in our models, only the specifications for fixed effects are rel-
evant). Specifically, the width (scaling parameter) of the Cauchy prior
was set at rA = .5, which can be viewed as a default reference analysis in
BANOVA models (e.g., Schönbrodt et al., 2017). To assess the robust-
ness of our results and the sensitivity to different prior distributional
assumptions, we also repeated the analyses with two further Cauchy
prior specifications: rA = 1/√2 and rA = 1. The Bayes factors from these
additional analyses are reported in Supplement 6 and led to conclusions
that were not qualitatively different from the analyses reported in
Section 4.
5 We also examined whether the achieved gains in a given round (condi-
tion) correlated with subsequent ratings of affect and arousal at the end
of that round. We found a positive rank correlation between achieved
gains and affect for both younger adults (τ = .41, BF10 = 25.60) and
older adults (τ = .30, BF10 = 5.60)—but only when rewards were real
and high (evidence for correlations between gains and affect or arousal
was inconclusive in the other conditions). Moreover, the correlations
among ratings of affect (all τ > .34, BFs10 > 100) and among ratings of
arousal (all τ > .66, BFs10 > 100), respectively, were all positive,
suggesting that people who provided high ratings in one round also
tended to provide high ratings in the other rounds of the decision task.
REFERENCES
Beattie, J., & Loomes, G. (1997). The impact of incentives upon risky
choice experiments. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 14(2), 155–168.
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007721327452
Best, R., & Charness, N. (2015). Age differences in the effect of framing on
risky choice: A meta-analysis. Psychology and Aging, 30(3), 688–698.
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0039447
Binswanger, H. P. (1980). Attitudes toward risk: Experimental measure-
ment in rural India. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 62(3),
395–407. https://doi.org/10.2307/1240194
Bruine de Bruin, W., Parker, A. M., & Fischhoff, B. (2020). Decision-
making competence: More than intelligence? Current Directions in
Psychological Science, 29(2), 186–192. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0963721420901592
Camerer, C. F., & Hogarth, R. M. (1999). The effects of financial incentives
in experiments: A review and capital-labor-production framework.
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19(1), 7–42. https://doi.org/10.1023/
A:1007850605129
Davies, J. B., & Shorrocks, A. F. (2000). The distribution of wealth. In A. B.
Atkinson & F. Bourguignon (Eds.), Handbook of income distribution
(Vol. 1, pp. 605–675). Elsevier.
Dhami, M. K., Schlottmann, A., & Waldmann, M. R. (Eds.) (2011). Judgment
and decision making as a skill: Learning, development and evolution. Uni-
versity Press.
Ebner, N. C., Freund, A. M., & Baltes, P. B. (2006). Developmental
changes in personal goal orientation from young to late adulthood:
From striving for gains to maintenance and prevention of losses.
Psychology and Aging, 21, 664–678. https://doi.org/10.1037/0882-
7974.21.4.664
Edwards, W. (1953). Probability-preferences in gambling. The American
Journal of Psychology, 66(3), 349–364. https://doi.org/10.2307/
1418231
Figner, B., & Weber, E. U. (2011). Who takes risks when and why? Deter-
minants of risk taking. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20(4),
211–216. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721411415790
Freund, A. M., & Blanchard-Fields, F. (2014). Age-related differences in
altruism across adulthood: Making personal financial gain versus
contributing to the public good. Developmental Psychology, 50(4),
1125–1136. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0034491
Freund, A. M., & Ebner, N. C. (2005). The aging self: Shifting from
promoting gains to balancing losses. In W. Greve, K. Rothermund, &
D. Wentura (Eds.), The adaptive self: Personal continuity and intentional
self-development (pp. 185–202). Hogrefe & Huber Publishers.
Freund, A. M., & Riediger, M. (2001). What I have and what I do: The role
of resource loss and gain throughout life. Applied Psychology, 50,
370–380. https://doi.org/10.1111/1464-0597.00063
Frey, R., Mata, R., & Hertwig, R. (2015). The role of cognitive abilities in
decisions from experience: Age differences emerge as a function of
choice set size. Cognition, 142, 60–80. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cognition.2015.05.004
Frey, R., Pedroni, A., Mata, R., Rieskamp, J., & Hertwig, R. (2017). Risk
preference shares the psychometric structure of major psychological
traits. Science Advances, 3(10), e1701381. https://doi.org/10.1126/
sciadv.1701381
Hertwig, R., & Ortmann, A. (2001). Experimental practices in economics:
A methodological challenge for psychologists? Behavioral and
Brain Sciences, 24(3), 383–403. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S0140525X01004149
Hess, T. M., Strough, J., & Löckenhoff, C. E. (Eds.) (2015). Aging and
decision making: Empirical and applied perspectives. Elsevier Academic
Press.
Hinne, M., Gronau, Q. F., van den Bergh, D., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2020).
A conceptual introduction to Bayesian model averaging. Advances in
Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 3(2), 200–215. https://
doi.org/10.1177/2515245919898657
Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. Amer-
ican Economic Review, 92(5), 1644–1655. https://doi.org/10.1257/
000282802762024700
Horn, S. S., & Freund, A. M. (2021). How do gain and loss incentives affect
memory for intentions across adulthood? The Journals of Gerontology:
Series B, 76(4), 711–721. https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbaa140
Jimura, K., Myerson, J., Hilgard, J., Keighley, J., Braver, T. S., & Green, L.
(2011). Domain independence and stability in young and older adults'
discounting of delayed rewards. Behavioural Processes, 87(3), 253–259.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.beproc.2011.04.006
Josef, A. K., Richter, D., Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Wagner, G. G.,
Hertwig, R., & Mata, R. (2016). Stability and change in risk-taking
propensity across the adult life span. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 111(3), 430–450. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000090
HORN AND FREUND 11
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of deci-
sion under risk. Econometrica, 47(2), 263–292. https://doi.org/10.
2307/1914185
Kellen, D., Mata, R., & Davis-Stober, C. P. (2017). Individual classification
of strong risk attitudes: An application across lottery types and age
groups. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 24(4), 1341–1349. https://doi.
org/10.3758/s13423-016-1212-5
Kühberger, A., Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M., & Perner, J. (2002). Framing deci-
sions: Hypothetical and real. Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 89(2), 1162–1175. https://doi.org/10.1016/
S0749-5978(02)00021-3
Lejarraga, T., Pachur, T., Frey, R., & Hertwig, R. (2016). Decisions from
experience: From monetary to medical gambles. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making, 29(1), 67–77.
Lindenberger, U., Mayr, U., & Kliegl, R. (1993). Speed and intelligence in
old age. Psychology and Aging, 8, 207–220. https://doi.org/10.1037/
0882-7974.8.2.207
Locey, M. L., Jones, B. A., & Rachlin, H. (2011). Real and hypothetical
rewards. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(6), 552–564.
Löckenhoff, C. E., Rutt, J. L., Samanez-Larkin, G. R., O'Donoghue, T.,
Reyna, V. F., & Ganzel, B. (2016). Dread sensitivity in decisions
about real and imagined electrical shocks does not vary by age.
Psychology and Aging, 31(8), 890–901. https://doi.org/10.1037/
pag0000136
Madden, G. J., Begotka, A. M., Raiff, B. R., & Kastern, L. L. (2003). Delay
discounting of real and hypothetical rewards. Experimental and Clinical
Psychopharmacology, 11(2), 139–145. https://doi.org/10.1037/1064-
1297.11.2.139
Mamerow, L., Frey, R., & Mata, R. (2016). Risk taking across the life span:
A comparison of self-report and behavioral measures of risk taking.
Psychology and Aging, 31(7), 711–723. https://doi.org/10.1037/
pag0000124
Mata, R., Josef, A. K., Samanez-Larkin, G. R., & Hertwig, R. (2011). Age dif-
ferences in risky choice: A meta-analysis. Annals of the new York Acad-
emy of Sciences, 1235, 18–29. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.
2011.06200.x
Mather, M., & Carstensen, L. L. (2005). Aging and motivated cognition:
The positivity effect in attention and memory. Trends in Cognitive Sci-
ences, 9(10), 496–502. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.08.005
Mather, M., Mazar, N., Gorlick, M. A., Lighthall, N. R., Burgeno, J.,
Schoeke, A., & Ariely, D. (2012). Risk preferences and aging: The “cer-
tainty effect” in older adults' decision making. Psychology and Aging,
27(4), 801–816. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030174
Mayr, U., & Freund, A. M. (2020). Do we become more prosocial as we
age, and if so, why? Current Directions in Psychological Science, 29(3),
248–254. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721420910811
Olschewski, S., Rieskamp, J., & Scheibehenne, B. (2018). Taxing cognitive
capacities reduces choice consistency rather than preference: A
model-based test. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 147(4),
462–484. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000403
Pachur, T., Mata, R., & Hertwig, R. (2017). Who dares, who errs? Dis-
entangling cognitive and motivational roots of age differences in deci-
sions under risk. Psychological Science, 28(4), 504–518. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0956797616687729
Pedroni, A., Frey, R., Bruhin, A., Dutilh, G., Hertwig, R., & Rieskamp, J.
(2017). The risk elicitation puzzle. Nature Human Behaviour, 1(11),
803–809. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-017-0219-x
Peters, E., Hess, T. M., Västfjäll, D., & Auman, C. (2007). Adult age differ-
ences in dual information processes: Implications for the role of affec-
tive and deliberative processes in older adults' decision making.
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 2(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.
1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00025.x
Ravert, R. D., Murphy, L. M., & Donnellan, M. B. (2019). Valuing risk:
Endorsed risk activities and motives across adulthood. Journal of Adult
Development, 26(1), 11–21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10804-018-
9300-6
Reyna, V. F. (2011). Across the lifespan. In B. Fischhoff, N. T. Brewer, &
J. S. Downs (Eds.), Communicating risks and benefits: An evidence-based
user's guide (pp. 111–119). U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices, Food and Drug Administration.
Roalf, D. R., Mitchell, S. H., Harbaugh, W. T., & Janowsky, J. S. (2012). Risk,
reward, and economic decision making in aging. Journals of Gerontology
Series B: Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 67(3), 289–298.
https://doi.org/10.1093/geronb/gbr099
Rolison, J. J., Hanoch, Y., Wood, S., & Liu, P.-J. (2014). Risk-taking differ-
ences across the adult life span: A question of age and domain. The
Journals of Gerontology: Series B, 69(6), 870–880. https://doi.org/10.
1093/geronb/gbt081
Schönbrodt, F. D., Wagenmakers, E.-J., Zehetleitner, M., & Perugini, M.
(2017). Sequential hypothesis testing with Bayes factors: Efficiently
testing mean differences. Psychological Methods, 22(2), 322–339.
https://doi.org/10.1037/met0000061
Seaman, K. L., Brooks, N., Karrer, T. M., Castrellon, J. J., Perkins, S. F.,
Dang, L. C., Hsu, M., Zald, D. H., & Samanez-Larkin, G. R. (2018). Sub-
jective value representations during effort, probability and time dis-
counting across adulthood. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience,
13(5), 449–459. https://doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsy021
Siegel, S., & Goldstein, D. A. (1959). Decision-making behavior in a two-
choice uncertain outcome situation. Journal of Experimental Psychology,
57(1), 37–42. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0045959
Simonson, I., & Tversky, A. (1992). Choice in context: Tradeoff contrast
and extremeness aversion. Journal of Marketing Research, 29(3),
281–295. https://doi.org/10.2307/3172740
Slovic, P. (1969). Differential effects of real versus hypothetical payoffs on
choices among gambles. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 80(3),
434–437. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0027489
Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1968). Relative importance of probabilities
and payoffs in risk taking. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 78(3),
1–18. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0026468
Smith, V. L., & Walker, J. M. (1993). Monetary rewards and decision cost
in experimental economics. Economic Inquiry, 31(2), 245–261. https://
doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1993.tb00881.x
Taylor, M. P. (2013). Bias and brains: Risk aversion and cognitive ability
across real and hypothetical settings. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,
46(3), 299–320. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-013-9166-8
Tymula, A., Belmaker, L. A. R., Ruderman, L., Glimcher, P. W., & Levy, I.
(2013). Like cognitive function, decision making across the life span
shows profound age-related changes. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences, 110(42), 17143–17148. https://doi.org/10.
1073/pnas.1309909110
Verhaeghen, P., & Salthouse, T. A. (1997). Meta-analyses of age–cognition
relations in adulthood: Estimates of linear and nonlinear age effects
and structural models. Psychological Bulletin, 122(3), 231–249. https://
doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.122.3.231
von Helversen, B., Coppin, G., & Scheibehenne, B. (2020). Money does not
stink: Using unpleasant odors as stimulus material changes risky deci-
sion making. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 33(5), 593–605.
Wagenmakers, E. J., Love, J., Marsman, M., Jamil, T., Ly, A., Verhagen, J., …
Meerhoff, F. (2018). Bayesian inference for psychology. Part II: Exam-
ple applications with JASP. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 25, 58–76.
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-017-1323-7
Weller, J. A., Levin, I. P., & Denburg, N. L. (2011). Trajectory of risky
decision making for potential gains and losses from ages 5 to 85.
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 24(4), 331–344. https://doi.org/
10.1002/bdm.690
Zilker, V., Hertwig, R., & Pachur, T. (2020). Age differences in risk attitude
are shaped by option complexity. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General, 149(9), 1644–1683. https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0000741
12 HORN AND FREUND
AUTHORS' BIOGRAPHIES
Sebastian Horn is a senior researcher at the University of Zurich,
Switzerland. His work focuses on understanding the motivational
impact of gains and losses on decision making and memory across
the lifespan. His broader research interests lie at the inter-
section between lifespan developmental psychology, cognitive
science, and mathematical modeling.
Alexandra M. Freund is a professor of developmental psychology
at the University of Zurich, Switzerland. Her central research
questions concern how motivation develops across adulthood and
how motivational changes affect emotions, cognition, and behav-
ior. She endorses a multi-methodological approach encompassing
correlative and experimental designs using self-report, behavior
assessment, and physiology.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found online in the
Supporting Information section at the end of this article.
How to cite this article: Horn, S., & Freund, A. M. (2021).
Adult age differences in monetary decisions with real and
hypothetical reward. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,
1–13. https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.2253
HORN AND FREUND 13
